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"You tell me it's the institution .... " 
Lennon/McCartney 
To the committed empiricist, the 
pages which follow will seem no more 
credible than a child's tortured dream. 
Yet even the committed empirist must 
recognize that for the time being at 
least there are areas inaccessible to 
him, areas where what passes for 
knowledge must be no more than a 
network of intuitions and theories 
dimly grasped. The current "malaise" 
at the Law School is a subject which 
lies in such an area. Faculty and 
student body seem equally affected, 
but neither seems able to express its 
feelings in any way except indirectly, 
in moments of bitterness or disillusion-
ment, in lethargy or a febrile 
verbalism. It is perhaps because of this 
elusive quality of the subject that I 
find myself unable to approach it in 
any other tone than that of moral 
exhortation. 
Let me begin with a brief 
statement of the values to which I 
appeal. First, I am very glad to be a 
member of the community of the Law 
School; my motives in writing are 
anything but destructive. I would like 
to do something to improve our lives 
as people living together; if the 
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Mr. Kennedy is a student at the Yale 
Law School. 
The following two articles are the initial 
installment in a continuing symposium 
on legal education. 
critique is at times bitter, it is with 
that hope. It would not have occurred 
to me to write this paper if I did not 
think I could appeaJ to the sense of 
moral obligation which underlies the 
concepts of "teacher" and "lawyer," 
and to the urge for craftsmanlike 
"effectiveness" combined with social 
responsibility which brings most 
students here. 
Finally, it should be clear that I 
am not a "trained observer" in any of 
the disciplines upon which this paper 
draws. Nor is this an attempt at an 
"Anthropology of the Legal Profes-
sion," based on some kind of 
"research." 1 My purpose is to add 
depth to what thus far has been a 
disappointingly shallow debate about 
legal education. 
1
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l. The Teachers 
The faculty, as a group, make 
much of their own atomization. They 
refer with pride to the fact that in any 
faculty discussion there are "43 
different points of view." Nonetheless, 
to the student body they are very 
much the "Faculty," a group of 
"individuals" without doubt, but very 
much a group. They are unified in the 
eyes of students by far more than the 
fact that they all teach at the same 
institution. There is "the manner." 
One of the first and most lasting 
impressions that many students have 
of the Law School is that the teachers 
are either astoundingly intellectually 
self-confident or just plain smug. Many 
of them seem to their students to be 
preening themselves before their 
classes. In most cases, each gesture 
seems to say: "I am brilliant. I am 
famous in the only community that 
matters. I am doing the most difficult 
and most desirable thing in the world, 
and doing it well; I am being a Law 
Professor." 
As might be expected, the feeling 
of being in the presence of a truly 
extraordinary narcissistic phenomenon 
diminishes somewhat with time. But it 
is still shocking to hear professors 
dismiss all disciplines but the law as 
intellectually shoddy and practitioners 
in other fields as a class of dolts. It is 
hard for the student not to wince at 
the air of magisterial self-satisfaction 
with which professors tend to 
approach questions they know little 
about. No amount of actual brilliance 
(and I will get to that point later) 
justifies the pose. 
"Smugness" is a minor vice. There 
is another quality which is very 
generally perceived in the faculty 
which is much more important: 
hostility. I am now speaking only of 
the students' perceptions of the 
professors' manner. It is of course 
possible (but I think in fact not true) 
that everything I describe is a 
collective hallucination of the student 
body. What I am asserting-as a fact-is 
that if you ask the more sensitive 
students what they feel is the 
dominant tone of the classroom of this 
or that professor, and then probe the 
answer even a little bit, you will 
discover the perception of hostility.2 
There are as many variants to the 
perception of hostility as there are to 
the expression of it. For some 
students, the teachers are "conde-
scending," or insufferably paternal. 
Others speak in terms of an underlying 
contempt. The formulation may be 
almost pathetically indirect: "He is so 
brilliant; there is no reason why he 
should care about me." "He's very 
nasty, but I suppose I need it." "It's 
understandable that he should hate 
teaching first year students year after 
year." Other teachers evoke a more 
direct response: everyone in class is 
quite conscious of being disliked. 
This perception is strongest 
among first year students, and is 
weaker in seminars than in large 
classes, but these differences are only 
quantitative. Hostility is sometimes 
seen as embodied in a teacher's actual 
words. A great many students, of all 
levels of academic competence and of 
many varieties of personality, feel the 
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socratic method (the basic question 
and answer, suggestion and criticism, 
approach, rather than the. stricter 
version once popular and now 
practiced by only a few teachers) is an 
assault. The observation3 that students 
often respond physically and 
emotionally to questioning as though 
they were in the presence of a 
profound danger is simply true. A 
participant or observer not blinded by 
his own fear or by his involvement in 
practicing the technique notices the 
student response almost immediately. 
Few will deny that the atmosphere of 
the first year classroom is as heavy 
with fear as it is tense with intellectual 
excitement. The point here is more 
than that: students see professors as 
people who want to hurt them; 
professors' actions often do hurt them, 
deeply. 
It is not only open verbal attack 
or the socratic method which is seen as 
hostile. Each of us interprets the 
emotions of his interlocutor by far 
more than the content of his language. 
Tones of voice, physical mannerisms~ 
facial expression, cast of eye-all these 
are as important in the classroom as 
they are anywhere else in life. What is 
conveyed-for whatever reason-is 
extraordinarily often contempt, or 
disgust, or what one student described 
as "ice-cold indifference." A professor 
who lectures can get this across as 
effectively as a professor who proceeds 
by question and answer. 
Teachers who are hostile are not 
generally dull, although they are 
sometimes insufferably so. They may 
be greatly loved by their students; 
they may provoke an admirable 
response, from both the human and 
the intellectual point of view. They 
may be-but very often are not-
unusually effective pedagogues. 
It is perfectly clear that most 
professors are largely unconscious of 
the effect they are producing. Yet in 
fact, more open displays of anger-
such as a walkout when no one in the 
class is prepared-are often perceived 
as less deeply hostile than the vague 
aura given off by a teacher who seems 
perfectly content in the classroom 
situation. 
I hope that what has been said 
thus far will not be dismissed as simply 
outrageous. I might muster in support 
of my description the testimony of a 
large number of outside observers-
formal and informal-but that seems 
unnecessary. I have dealt only with the 
students' perception. That is a matter 
of fact, however little susceptible to 
legal methods of proof, and may be 
investigated "in the field" by any 
faculty member. 
The picture would be incomplete 
without a brief description of the 
students' view of the faculty member 
out of class. Before that perception 
occurs, a hurdle must be jumped. 
Some faculty members are accessible; 
others are not. Simply because it is a 
part of a more general emotional 
atmosphere, inaccessibility is 
interpreted to some limited extent as 
an expression of indifference or 
contempt. (I hope no one will draw 
the inference that I favor the abolition 
of either legal research or the 
professors' right to privacy.) 
The interesting thing about the 
students' relationship with the faculty 
member with whom he does come into 
contact is its positively dizzying 
warmth. The classroom manner 
disappears almost altogether, and is 
replaced by a total openness, a 
universal solicitude and receptivity, 
which is its mirror image. The 
professor will often patiently bind up 
the lacerations inflicted in public ten 
minutes or an hour before, and add a 
word of encouragement which is like a 
laying on of hands.4 The reaction of 
the student is likely to be profoundly 
filial. My own feeling is that the 
relationship of master and disciple that 
tends to develop from such encounters 
often (but by no means always) has an 
element at least of the degrading: the 
student is too vulnerable, too passive, 
to be able to deal with the professor as 
a man. But even this limited kind of 
solace is available to only a small 
minority of students, generally those 
who are academically successful. For 
the vast majority, the experience of 
the law which dominates all others is 
that of the classroom. 
Supposing that the situation exists 
as I describe it, what is to be said of it? 
At a bare minimum it seems to me 
Jhat the faculty as a group is guilty of 
an astounding lack of awareness of 
what they are doing. They have 
neglected a professional responsibility 
of the first order, and in so doing have 
inflicted emotional harm on their 
students. They are as much the losers 
as the students. A person who is 
unable to come to grips with his own 
impact on the world around him is an 
~mpoverished person. 
This strikes me as a weak way of 
putting the point, as will appear. First, 
however, I would like to deal with 
some of the arguments which will be 
put forward "in mitigation" by those 
who do not reject my thesis out of 
hand. 
It is asserted that the members of 
the faculty treat each other in the 
same "straightforward" manner 
(sometimes conceived by faculty 
members as that of the "hard-headed 
seeker after truth") that they treat the 
students. Two observations are in 
order. First, it is clear that most 
faculty members make distinctions 
among students in their conduct. 
Some are treated in ways which give 
rise to far stronger perceptions of 
hostility than are others. The student 
who has established some tenuous 
claim to intellectual ability, either in 
the classroom or in his exams, is 
accorded a measure of apparent 
respect in his dealings with teachers in 
class. The teacher's attack may be no 
less fierce, but the gleeful thrvst for 
the jugular is less apparent. This 
suggests at least that faculty members 
are not constitutionally incapable of 
acting as human beings outside their 
offices. 
Secondly, it is the most elemen-
tary sort of moral principle that a 
person with power to affect the lives 
of others should be aware of the 
meaning of his conduct in the eyes of 
those others. A given set of manner-
isms means one thing when an 
established law professor attacks 
another established law professor who 
is also his friend or long time associate. 
The same conduct is likely to mean 
something altogether different when 
indulged in from the podium against a 
terrified student. Law students often 
call each others' arguments idiotic and 
heap ridicule on each other in debate. 
Surely no one would argue that this 
behavior would have the same social 
meaning if engaged in in class against 
professors? 
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Another argument in mitigation is 
that if the students now see the 
faculty as hostile, a profound change 
has occurred. In the old days (the 
early sixties) students simply did not 
respond that way; in fact, they 
enjoyed the "give and take" and were 
able to profit from it without 
emotional problems. The faculty's 
difficulties in handling the new 
situation are therefore understandable. 
I am willing to admit that the faculty's 
perception of the students' response 
has changed radically in the last two 
years. I am also willing to admit that 
several years ago, few, if any, students 
formulated their response in the way a 
growing number of students now do. I 
do not admit, however, that the 
problem of hostility was any less great 
then than it is now. 
The faculty's perception of the 
student response to law school has 
altered in two ways: as they see it, 
there has been a spate of "radical" 
student criticism of the Law School, 
emotional attacks on the institution, 
and dark rumors of student rebellion; 
there appears to a number of 
professors to have been a decline in 
student interest in the law as taught, a 
sort of spreading indifference to the 
whole enterprise, a deadness in every 
classroom discussion. None of this 
indicates to me that students of other 
years did not feel a current of hostility 
from their teachers. I think a far more 
plausible hypothesis is a change in 
student response to the perception of 
faculty hostility. 
Is the problem simply one of 
perception? It seems abundantly clear 
to me that what the students see is 
more than a mirage, that a vast 
amount of destructive energy does in 
fact go into the teaching of law as 
presently practiced. I should say at the 
beginning, however, that the student 
response to that hostile current is so 
much more extreme than what one 
would expect that it too requires 
considerable investigation. The 
atmosphere of the Law School, which 
often strikes me as an alternation 
between a peculiar intensity and an 
even more peculiar frozen deadness, is 
certainly as much a product of 
students as of teachers. 
Only a few of the faculty are open 
to the idea that certain of their 
colleagues are hostile to students. Far 
fewer will be able to accept that this 
quality is an important element in 
their own teaching. How to persuade 
that there is at least some underlying 
reality to the student perception? 
Many faculty members recognize, 
sometimes with a rather unbashful 
pride, that they are aggressive people, 
and no less so in the classroom than 
out of it. It should not be so very 
difficult to admit that a substantial 
part of the pleasure of being aggressive 
in class consists of being able to 
demolish students. And that another 
substantial part consists of being able 
to impose on them, by "main force" 
of reason, a concept or a conclusion 
they might not have reached alone. 
Teachers must realize, if only 
indistinctly, that their students are 
aware of the pleasure that is taken in 
their subjection. 
I do not mean, at this stage of the 
argument, either to reject or to accept 
aggressiveness as a useful pedagogic 
tool. Even less do I mean to imply that 
all law professors, all the time, are 
unrestrained sadists. In fact, professors 
often seem, in their most aggressive 
moments, to be struggling manfully to 
restrain an inward rage which baffles 
them. Sometimes, a gesture meant to 
hurt is followed instantly by a sort of 
apology. I am convinced that most 
teachers at the Law School love their 
students, and in a way which is 
admirable. And yet in the long run 
there must be something deeply 
corrupting about the daily exercise of 
a license to inflict pain. 
Inflicting pain is a part of life, it 
will be said, and must be accepted as 
an essential element of many processes 
by which people attain objectives 
which are enormously valuable to 
others as well as to themselves. I think 
that quite true. But it is equally true, 
and more important, that a person 
who has not come to terms with his 
own pleasure in inflicting pain is an 
incomplete and often a dangerous 
person. What is most striking about 
many members of the faculty is their 
obliviousness to what must be one of 
the most important elements in their 
lives. That obliviousness is a derelic-
tion, not because self-knowledge is a 
good in itself, but because it is 
indispensable to responsibility. 
Before turning to the role of the 
students in the Law School com-
munity, I have a few tentative 
suggestions for an explanation of the 
phenomenon I have been describing. 
Law professors were once law 
students, and like most law students 
tend to be unusually aggressive people. 
After their academic successes, many 
of them came early to teaching and 
have stayed long. It is interesting to 
think about some of the elements of 
the equilibrium that keeps these 
unusually intelligent men at this 
particular remove from "real life." 
Most aggressive people, myself 
included, find themselves confronted 
with a difficult problem: how to 
channel their energy in basically 
constructive rather than destructive 
directions. The problem is both moral 
and social. Teaching law is an 
attractive solution. A great deal of 
aggression can be let off in the 
classroom, and whatever destruction 
occurs may be not only justified in the 
name of "effectiveness' but also 
rewarded with admiration and respect. 
The mastery and sometimes the 
transformation of the law itself offers 
a parallel satisfaction. The live and 
undocile client represents a kind of 
threat to a cherished self-control, and 
is to be kept at a distance. It is not the 
real world itself, but the possible 
violence of one's response to it which 
is frightening. 
Students are tnghtemng too, m a 
variety of ways, and this explains some 
of the violence of the response to 
them. Some teachers seem to feel that 
they must be "tough" in order to 
"control" their classes, not in the 
sense of preventing pandemonium but 
in that of restraining the students' 
desire to disintegrate discussions into 
irrelevance. Others respond instantly 
to the slightest suggestion-that a 
student is becoming "uppity," 
whether by humor or by a manifest 
unwillingness to give himself to the 
socratic game. The powerful artillery 
of ridicule is often rolled out with an 
abruptness which suggests something 
close to panic. 
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All this is "curbstone psycho-
analysis" run wild, I freely admit. 
There are of course numerous other 
characteristics of law professors which 
might be singled out, and there are a 
multiplicity of individual responses to 
this particular problem. And no one 
element "explains" the atmosphere of 
the Law School. Nonetheless I find it 
helpful in trying to understand what I 
see around me. A rather grim 
conclusion is suggested: the element of 
destructive aggression, of terrorism, in 
teaching law is a real "psychic good" 
for the teacher. A critique which 
challenges the morality of that good is 
therefore unlikely to get a sympathetic 
response. 5 
II. The Students 
At the threshold, it seems well to 
address the argument that the Law 
School has no effect on the personal-
ities of its students. It seems incredible 
that anyone-and especially a 
teacher-should put this view forward, 
but it happens quite often among 
those who find inquiries of the sort 
attempted here particularly distasteful. 
The answer is that it is at best naive 
for the faculty to suppose, with 
evident self-satisfaction, that the 
School brilliantly transforms the 
unwashed first year student into an 
elegant whiz-kid or sturdy craftsman, 
but that the process is somehow 
purely "intellectual." If nothing more 
than the capacity of one's "mind" 
(whatever that means) is changed by 
the Law School, then surely the 
institution is a failure. This is not to 
suggest that the students can 
legitimately shift responsibility for all 
the ills of the lawyer-infested "real 
world" onto the backs of the poor 
teachers. I mean only that to deny 
that teachers affect students is 
self-delusion of a rather shoddy sort. 
A. Some General Observations 
One of the most striking 
characteristics of the first year at the 
Law School is that a very great deal of 
social interaction goes on among 
students in class, even though the 
situation would appear to an outsider 
to be completely dominated by the 
relationship between the teacher and 
the individual he is interrogating. To a 
large extent, students get to know the 
group to which they belong before 
they make large numbers of individual 
friends; the character of the group is 
thus very important in their feeling 
about the Law School in general. 
The atmosphere of collective 
terror has already been mentioned. It 
is important that we are dealing with a 
particular kind of terror: that of a 
person who knows himself defenseless 
before a person who has a demon-
strated desire to hurt him. The 
salutary feeling of tension before going 
into battle is notably absent during the 
ten minutes between classes. The fear 
is the fear of the victim. 6 
First year students when acting as 
a group in class are as cruel if not 
crueler than the teachers. 7 They howl 
with glee when one of their number is 
dismembered. Many times during the 
first year I felt ashamed that my own 
laughter was uncontrollable, that the 
slight hysteria in the room infected me 
too. But the teacher who provokes, 
orchestrates and then openly revels in 
these displays should be far more 
ashamed. This is not to say by any 
means that all the humor is cruel, nor 
that it is only humor which can be 
cruel. There is something more 
degrading still about the professorial 
tone which invites the whole class to 
join in contempt for a student's point. 
Even those who do not succumb to 
laughter must sometimes accept this 
other sort of invitation, no matter how 
well they know that the contempt will 
eventually be turned on them as well. 
But most impressive of all is the 
group's submission. Students in first 
year classes at the Law School are rapt 
as no other students I have ever seen. 
They are so emotionally enthralled by 
the process going on around them that 
they miss obvious points they would 
catch instantly outside class, and fall 
into traps or deliberately confusing 
trains of thought when their basic 
understanding is perfectly sound. They 
accept the importance of what they 
are about largely without question, 
and lay themselves bare to the tender 
mercies of the teacher with an 
astonishing humility. 
The contradictory emotions 
which underlie the "normal" 
classroom response are suggested by a 
number of remarks which are repeated 
over and over again-often with a 
slightly ridiculous conviction-outside 
of class: "Anyone who can get into 
this school has to be very, very smart 
to start with." "I just didn't under-
stand a single word of what he was 
saying today." Or: "He's brilliant. He 
was number one in his class and editor 
of the Law Review at .""I 
hate that guy." Or: "I couldn't care 
less about grades or all this competi-
tion." "I know I won't do very well. I 
just know it. You can tell." 
While the characteristic of the 
student body which is most in the 
minds of everyone at the Law School 
is that they all did superbly well 
before coming here, there are a 
number of other widespread qualities 
which are important in understanding 
the students' response to the way they 
are taught. Students arriving in the last 
few years have been through what 
amounts to a prolonged nation-wide 
competition of intimidating rigrn;. 
When they say they are not competi-
tive, they must mean something very 
strange, or be deluding themselves. 
Law students as a group are more 
aggressive than students in other 
professional disciplines,8 although 
many of them are clearly much less 
aggressive than their teachers. 
Nonetheless, they vary greatly in their 
real ability-or perhaps only prepara-
tion-to handle the law as an academic 
subject. They are almost all over 
twenty-one, but very few of them have 
had any experience of the real world 
beyond that acquired during summers 
and perhaps in a year or two in the 
especially unreal world of an English 
university. Their self-confidence is 
likely to be dependent to some 
significant degree on their past 
academic successes, or on their 
prestige at other educational 
institutions. They are moving toward a 
time of life when crucial decisions 
about one's role in life must be made, 
a time when many talented young men 
find themselves afflicted with an 
unaccustomed indecision and 
self-doubt.9 
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A basic question which most 
students ask themselves more or less 
repeatedly throughout the first year is: 
Why am I taking this shit from them? 
It is not the work load which is being 
challenged. It is the underlying 
relationship of teacher to student. Is it 
acceptable at 22 or 23 or 24 to let 
oneself be publicly insulted, day after 
day, by another man no matter how 
brilliant? Is it acceptable to submerge 
oneself in a group which responds with 
Pavlovian consistency to suggestions 
you find degrading? Is it acceptable, 
after years spent dealing with the 
complicated emotions inevitably 
involved in the relations of intelligent 
and aggressive young men with their 
fathers, to plunge oneself into an 
essentially paternalistic community 
where the route to success is to 
establish yourself firmly in the 
affections of powerful older men? 
On the most obvious level, this 
question is answered in one or both of 
the following ways: "It's intellectually 
stimulating." "I want to be a good 
lawyer." The validity of these 
justifications will be examined later. 
On a deeper level, I have a strong 
intuition, surprisingly often confirmed 
indirectly in talking to people, that the 
answer is: "Because I deserve to take 
this shit. I am wrong and stupid. There 
is no reason why I should be treated 
by this great man with even the most 
minimal human respect." 
To go beyond these very general 
observations, it is necessary to begin 
dividing the students into different 
groups. There are many classifications 
one could choose. I have chosen three: 
according to academic success; 
according to the pleasure taken in the 
"intellectual" side of the law; 
according to degree of political 
"radicalism." 
B. Two Student Types 
I will proceed here by the 
construction of two "types," one 
meant to be representative of many 
aspects of students in the bottom half 
of the class; the other representing 
many students in the top quarter. Of 
course there is an infinity of responses 
to the Law School, and no description 
of a "type" can even begin to attain 
the complexity which is needed to 
understand an actual person. 
Nonetheless, the exercise may be 
useful. 
It seems best to state explicitly 
that I do not think the qualities I 
ascribe to my "types" are morally 
neutral. I think there is something 
quite clearly wrong with people who 
resemble the two "typical students" 
described: they fail in "integration," 
they compartmentalize their lives and 
fail to apply the same standards of 
self-knowledge and responsibility 
across the board; they lack wholeness; 
when one speaks with them, there is a 
sense that what they say about 
themselves is unreliable, sometimes 
"inauthentic," as though they had 
been unable to bring together in their 
own minds all the emotions, as well as 
all the arguments, which are relevant 
to how one feels about a given point. I 
am speaking in terms of the vaguest 
sort of moral standard, but a difficult 
one which I only very rarely have the 
courage to apply to myself. 
My first type comes to the Law 
School largely because he wants to be 
a lawyer-a good lawyer but not 
necessarily a famous one-and has 
heard that this is one of the best 
schools in the country. He is likely to 
have been very successful at academic 
competition, but he has not developed 
an overwhelmingly aggressive manner. 
When he first arrives he is eager to 
learn, and more than ready to 
contribute his bit in class, but he is 
somewhat uncertain about how well 
he will come out in comparison with 
the "brilliant" student body he has 
heard so much about. 
Throughout the first year this 
type is torn between a strong 
conviction that he will not ''make it" 
and a blind faith in the power of hard 
work to bring him through. The 
combined impact of the classroom and 
the aggressive bull session is over-
whelming to his self-confidence. When 
he gets distinctly mediocre grades, he 
is not really surprised; the formal seal 
has been put on a gradual process of 
changing his self-image, and behavior 
patterns which were fluid become set 
in a new mode. 1 0 
This type continues to go fairly 
regularly to class, and does a solid 
minimum of studying. His work does 
not improve; in fact it loses something 
in underlying seriousness as it gains in 
polish. What changes is his attitude. He 
adopts a pose of total indifference to 
the Law School and to the law, or 
better yet a quiet contempt tinged 
with cynicism for the whole business. 
He avoids teachers like the plague, 
except for occasional School social 
events where he is embarrassed, 
deferential, and somehow gives the 
impression that things are less than 
perfectly all right. In class he is often 
unprepared, but that is the least of the 
problem. When forced to recite there 
is an odd incoherence about what he 
says, apparently at least a total refusal 
to enter into the socratic dialogue in a 
meaningful way. This may be . 
perceived as sullen hostility or as 
stupidity by the teacher, who is 
surprised to discover that this same 
student is quite capable of behaving 
rather like a law professor in other 
circumstances. The almost comatose 
passivity of the student before even 
the most outrageous, or fascinating, 
statement made in class seems 
incomprehensible. 
This student learns a good deal of 
law, though much of it is understood 
in a particularly narrow way. The great 
unifying threads-philosophic, moral, 
intellectual-which draw apparently 
disparate areas together and give the 
law much of its fascination and much 
of its power are only indistinctly 
perceived, if at all. He also absorbs a 
quantum of Yale Law School rhetoric, 
and accepts, whether he knows it or 
not, a mass of legal knowledge which 
is riddled with the unexplored moral 
and philosophical biases of his 
teachers. The law is imposed on him, 
in a sense against his will. 
From a superficial point of view, 
this typical student might be said to 
have "beaten the system." He gets his 
Yale LL.B., a good job, and a certain 
polish in the use of legal concepts. 
Some of his type, of course, do 
extraordinarily well outside. While at 
the Law School, he seems to avoid the 
frustrations inevitable for people who 
are deeply involved in community life, 
and he also obtains a sort of revenge 
on the whole place by withholding a 
crucial part of himself. Afterwards, he 
will argue that the trouble with law 
school is that it teaches you nothing 
which is of any use in the "real 
world," meaning the world of 
corporate law practice. 
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What are the costs to the 
individual? First, it is simply not true 
that this type "learns the law" without 
being influenced by his professors. In 
fact, he is "brainwashed" in a quite 
real sense: his head is filled with 
notions he barely understands but 
which he will use every day of his life 
as a lawyer, often with enormous 
effect, for good or evil, on the lives of 
totally dependent people. The nature 
of his response to the teaching of law 
denies him a chance to understand the 
concepts by which he will live, and I 
am convinced that he will be a worse 
person for having participated so 
willingly in the denial. 
A second cost is harder to state: 
we lose something when we allow our 
fears, and the hostile pressure of the 
world around us, to drive us into 
passivity and cynicism. For an 
intelligent student eager to participate 
in the life going on around him to 
submit to becoming an apparently 
idiotic lump on a seat in a class is 
essentially degrading. 
The costs for the institution are 
much clearer: classes are boring and 
dead. But if this is true, how to 
explain the apparent increase in 
boringness and deadness which a 
number of faculty members .claim has 
occurred in the last few years? I will 
deal with this question in some detail 
later on. For the moment it is enough 
to point out that one suggested 
solution will have no practical effect. 
It is sometimes said that the problem 
is that the Law School has acquired an 
exaggerated reputation as a fascinating 
place for non-lawyers, and that the 
result has been the admission of many 
intelligent students who have no bent 
for the law, or interest in practicing it. 
The consequence is supposed to be a 
student body which rapidly becomes 
disillusioned with what they are doing 
(hence sullen and apathetic) and 
would be better off elsewhere. If my 
description of the apathetic student is 
correct, however, a change in "image" 
and admissions policy will have no 
effect on the "deadness" problem 
(although it might, of course, reduce 
the level of open, vocal protest against 
the "system"). Most of the students 
whose unwillingness to participate is 
so alarming tend to be both relatively 
sure of their vocation as lawyers and 
relatively little attracted by the more 
"sexy" aspects of the Law School's 
reputation. 
My second typical student is 
apparently worlds away from my first. 
He is in the top quarter of the class 
(therefore likely to be on the Law 
Journal) and quite openly very much 
involved in learning the law, participat-
ing in the community, and so forth. 
He is a success, and his existence is felt 
(both by himself and by the faculty) 
to justify whatever one may find 
unpleasant about the way the Law 
School operates. He sees a fair amount 
of the faculty, and gets in general an 
extremely friendly response. He 
participates in class as much as he sees 
fit: his silence is not mis-interpreted as 
stupidity, and what he does say is 
treated with some respect. 
What is interesting about this 
student is that he operates on two 
distinctly different levels, and is rather 
proud of it. There is a public 
self-most fully developed in relations 
with the faculty or with potential 
employers but also dominant in 
relations with the run of Law School 
acquaintances-which is characterized 
above all by control, an exact 
modulation of what is said to what is 
appropriate in the situation, an 
unusual preoccupation with getting 
directly to the point, getting the issue 
simplified down to manageable 
dimensions, avoiding "time wasting." 
All of these are of course 
attributes highly prized in successful 
lawyers. Nonetheless it is worthwhile 
to examine them further. The key 
element is control: my typical law 
student is impressed with his own 
intellectual mastery, but what is really 
unusual about him is the extent to 
which he is willing to banish fluid 
emotional response from his face-to-
face relations with a large part of the 
people he knows. He accepts the 
"context," whatever it may be, and 
achieves above all a sort of "respect-
ability." Getting directly to the point 
often means above all avoiding areas of 
ambiguity, "subjectivism," issues too 
large for him to understand or which 
may provoke fundamental disagree-
ment. "Time wasting" may in many 
circumstances be a synonym for 
"thought provoking." This approach is 
not limited to legal problems. Often, 
you will discover that my typical law 
student has adopted a series of 
simplifying "presumptions" for use in 
talking about love, death, power or 
anything else, although of course in his 
public role he is rarely willing to 
address these "time wasting" subjects 
at all. 
The pose is one of disciplined 
enthusiasm, aggressiveness toward "the 
problem to be solved" and passive 
respect for the poser of the problem 
and his definition of it. The student 
conveys "hungriness" with no 
suggestion of a threat; intelligence 
with no implication that underlying 
premises will be challenged. 
"But everything you describe is 
highly functional/operational/-
effective!" (Yes, Virginia, there is a 
Santa Claus.) Perhaps this is so. The 
subject will be taken up later. However 
it may be, this type is unlikely to 
accept this aspect of himself, no 
matter how "operational" it may be, 
as exhausting his potentialities as a 
human being. Instead, he builds a 
"private self" as a counter-model to 
the "public self." 
He thinks of himself as having a 
talent for creative writing, or perhaps 
an unprecedentedly warm and 
emotional family, or .an intuitive feel 
for music which would be incompre-
hensible to his classmates. Or perhaps 
he idealizes some moment of the past, 
and escapes into a haze of nostalgia 
whenever he is alone and not studying. 
Another pattern which would merit a 
paper in itself is that of the student 
who conceives of his relationships with 
women as being somehow a preserve 
wherein he is the diametric opposite of 
a "lawyer," as though it were really 
possible to turn selves on and off like 
faucets. 
Of course it is perfectly true that 
even successful law students do have 
private lives, and that these are often 
as rich in fact as they are felt to be. 
The point is that it is thought desirable 
to act in directly opposite ways in the 
two areas. As this type's public life 
becomes more and more controlled 
and aggressive, often more and more 
dishonest and in any case less and less 
emotionally satisfying, his private life 
is invested with vast quantities of 
intense feeling, sentimentality, 
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idealism and exaggerated protective-
ness. There is something truly pathetic 
about his terror of talking about these 
"private matters" in any context 
which, no matter how appropriate in 
other ways, has even a whiff of the 
"legal" about it. 
This type is likely to be quite 
aware that he has feelings of this kind. 
On those very rare occasions when he 
will discuss the matter with another 
person, he usually explains it in one of 
two ways: although he looks, talks, 
smells, and appears to think like a 
lawyer, in fact he is altogether 
different from his colleagues-he is a 
"real person"; alternatively, he has 
been forced to "compartmentalize" 
because The Law, and therefore all 
human relations connected with it, is 
"inhuman" or "cold." The first of 
these explanations would be more 
convincing if it were not for the fact 
that an astonishingly large number of 
successful law students share the idea 
that they are somehow "different," 
and that they all seem to be "differ-
ent" in similar ways. Whom are they 
"different" from? 
The second explanation implies an 
anthropomorphism of the law as 
misleading as the view of the law as a 
"brooding omnipresence." What is 
really meant is that as lawyers we 
behave in ways so destructive and so 
frightening that we must deny that 
behavior altogether in other parts of 
our lives. The existence of the 
adversary system does not "explain" 
why law students and law professors 
behave toward each other with 
hostility (nor does it explain the same 
traits among practicing lawyers). The 
guiding principles of the law, and the 
insights of its individual geniuses, are 
no more and often less "cold" than 
those of psychology or history. The 
behavior of our "public selves" which 
so alarms us is a social fact like any 
other, rooted in the way we live and 
understand ourselves. It is not in any 
sense "determined" by the abstract 
nature of what we study. If English 
literature were taught as law is, and by 
professors with the same complex of 
emotions toward their students and 
their work, I do not doubt for a 
minute that it too would be seen by 
students as "inhuman." 
An evaluation of the "effective-
ness" of such students is incomplete 
unless it includes some estimates of 
the psychological cost of their 
particular resolution of the problem of 
aggression (of course there are other 
problems involved as well). One cost 
seems to me to be that the division of 
life into hermetically sealed "private" 
(emotional) and "public" (effective-
ness) compartments must lead to 
deformations in both areas. There is 
more to the law than effectiveness. 
The values and emotions evoked in 
family life, for example, are highly 
relevant to many practical legal 
problems, and when they can be 
imported only implicitly, disguised in 
various kinds of "rational" dress, their 
impact cannot be fairly assessed. In 
the same way, the underlying values 
and approaches of the law do not exist 
in a vacuum; lawyers import them 
willy nilly into private life. When this 
is done unconsciously, the result is 
likely to be a group of insufferable tics 
and mannerisms rather than an 
enrichment. 
There is another aspect to the 
same problem: the creation of a model 
of private life in direct opposition to 
public life as a lawyer may make it 
possible to accept conduct in the 
public area which would otherwise be 
intolerable. Because I write short 
stories it is easier for me to accept the 
hostile atmosphere of the Law 
School-and of course less alarming to 
me when I myself become hostile in 
dealing with Law School acquaint-
ances. Solutions of this kind are 
attractive because they seem both 
"practical" and constructive. But is it 
really acceptable that all day long one 
should never even try to be one's 
whole self at any given moment? 
There is something irresponsible about 
a profession which organizes itself to 
utilize so much of a person's public 
energies without accepting the 
controls implied in his private 
emotions. 
The attainment of self-mastery in 
order to be able to serve others in the 
most effective possible way is an ideal 
which contains an ambiguity. In one 
sense it means learning to restrain 
one's impulses to greed and self-indul-
gence so that one can do good to other 
people and the community, and in this 
sense it is a moral ambition of a high 
order. In another, but closely related 
sense, it means learning to suppress 
any emotion that might offend one's 
master-whether individual or 
institutional-so as to be a more 
perfect tool to his ends, and in this 
sense it is anything but a moral 
ambition. I doubt that any law student 
can be really clear in his own mind as 
to what this ambiguity means to him; 
to pretend that it does not exist, or 
can be "resolved," is to court disaster. 
C. The Changing "Intellectual 
Response" at Law School 
The argument has been put 
forward that the reason for the growth 
of apathy and boredom at the Law 
School, and for some part of the 
criticism which has arisen in the last 
two years, is that we are going through 
a "trough" in interest in things 
intellectual. It is supposed that the 
domestic social crisis and the war in 
Vietnam have diverted the energy and 
interest of a whole generation of 
students away from the '·aesthetic 
experience" of the law. Students are 
struck by the impotence of the law 
they learn to change what they see as 
overwhelming evils in the society they 
live in, and they feel that what are 
offered as "interesting problems" are 
in fact irrelevant. 
It is easy to see the attraction of 
this view: it implies that the crisis is 
temporary. Sympathy for the students 
who must go through Law School at a 
particularly difficult time for the 
country can be combined with the 
hope that in a year or two New Haven 
will return to the atmosphere of the 
early Kennedy or late Eisenhower 
years. At the same time, the argument 
appeals to vast social forces altogether 
beyond the control of the individual 
professor; this both makes it difficult 
to refute and suggests that no one can 
do much about the phenomenon. 
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I think there is a kernel of truth 
and a bushel of obscurantism to this 
argument. A key to the whole 
proposition is the distinction between 
"intellectual" response and other 
kinds of response. It is certainly true 
that in a rough way one can distin-
guish intellectuals at the Law School 
from those who see the law more as a 
means than as an end in itself. Oddly 
enough, however, it seems to me that 
the real intellectuals are spread out 
among apathetic, successful and other 
kinds of students. A good number of 
people whose approach to non-legal 
matters is highly "intellectual" do not 
respond to Law School at all after the 
first year (or semester), and their 
indifference has nothing to do with 
the war in Vietnam. They have been 
"turned off," by the extraordinary 
atmosphere of hostility, by what they 
see as their own failure, or by 
something else peculiar to themselves. 
But there is a more fundamental 
criticism. I have a strong feeling 
that when a professor speaks about 
"intellectual response" in a classroom 
at the Law School, what he really 
means is an enthusiastic, eager, 
involved response to the particular 
question he has identified for the class 
as "interesting." Few teachers 
anywhere show an enormous amount 
of interest in exactly what it is that 
makes their students enthusiastic and 
excited until it becomes apparent to 
them that for some reason or another 
they have lost the capacity to evoke 
that response. One suspects that the 
emphasis on "intellect" is a way of 
shifting the onus onto the students. 
But forgetting about intellect, 
why the decline in enthusiasm and 
involvement? There are two aspects of 
the enthusiastic response that I think 
have been somewhat overlooked. To a 
very large extent, student behavior in 
the classroom is determined by group 
norms. Often, when the group has 
apparently made a decision that 
participation is appropriate, almost 
everyone participates, and enthusias-
tically. When the group has decided 
that participation is inappropriate, 
often no one at all participates. Of 
course the interest of the class for 
individual students is important, and is 
a significant factor in the group 
decision. But it is crucial to recognize 
that much more than a simple series of 
individual decisions is going on. 
This approach suggests some 
questions: Have students as a group 
changed their idea of what is an 
appropriate response to all classroom 
situations? Are there particular 
classroom characteristics which have 
become less likely to evoke a favorable 
group response? Of course to answer 
these questions one must appeal to 
broad social factors, and to that extent 
the Vietnam-intellectual response 
theory has validity. 
It is quite clear that students as a 
group condemn certain kinds of 
behavior, and always have: brown-nos-
ing is frowned upon; so are attempts 
to monopolize the discussion, 
digressions thought to be stupid or 
irrelevant, responses which show a lack 
of "cool," and so forth. To be 
aggressively "wrong" is very much 
frowned on, but to be totally passive 
and uncooperative is not. Being 
unprepared is not a sign of ignorance, 
nor is failure to pay attention a sin, 
however embarrassing it may be to 
everyone. A solid minimum of respect 
for the teacher is desirable; emotional 
outbursts of all kinds are not. 
For a number of reasons 
enthusiasm is on its way out as a 
socially acceptable response for most 
people in large classes as currently 
taught. The academic tensions of law 
school are not in any sense something 
new to this generation of.students: 
they have simply entered the last 
segment of a pipeline all of whose 
parts are neatly fitted together. 
Professors can no longer rely on their 
own much touted brilliance to make 
law school so much more interesting 
than college that the prolongation of 
helot status is acceptable. 
An increase in competitiveness has 
now brought into sharp relief a 
characteristic of pre-legal education 
which was always latent: a terrific 
emphasis on convergent reasoning 
(what is the right answer to this 
question?) as opposed to divergent 
reasoning (how many right answers or 
valid approaches can you think of for 
this question?) 1 1 The decline of rote 
learning is of ambiguous value. When 
memorization is replaced by the 
investment of staggering amounts of 
energy in the quest for the correct 
solution which will satisfy the teacher, 
and in avoidance of the wrong answer 
which will provoke anger or "ice cold 
indifference," the change may be on 
balance for the worse. 
The increase in competition and 
the emphasis on relatively sterile 
modes of understanding have been 
accompanied by a gradual change in 
the social meaning of the various 
stages of the growing-up process. 
"Successful" teenage boys are 
expected to behave in most ways 
exactly like grown men, to exhibit 
restraint and reasonableness, to do top 
grade work (to get Advanced 
Placement) and to accept the sort of 
"responsibility" which means obeying 
adult rules. On the other hand, they 
are allowed a "youth culture", from 
which adults are altogether excluded, 
in a setting in which it is not necessary 
to come to terms in any meaningful 
way with the demands of productive 
life in the "real world." 
College is not a change, especially 
at large universities. Adults continue 
to demand a very high level of 
performance, and continue to deny 
even a modicum of self-determination. 
Students live in a world made up of 
classmates where it is possible to play 
tlie 'system" of success without ever 
fully accepting that one day one will 
be one of them. A protraction of 
adolescence of this kind may be 
enormously productive from an 
academic point of view, it may be 
useful for society as currently 
organized, but it has costs as well. No 
student intelligent enough to get into 
this Law School can avoid feeling an 
odd ambivalence about going through 
three more years as a peculiar kind of 
half-tnan. Yet there are not many 
students who are really prepared for 
anything else. ''Success," which has 
consumed their energies for years, is 
their only real connection with 
adulthood. 
There are many possible responses 
to this situation, including giving 
oneself enthusiastically to the new 
process, or "radical" rejection of the 
whole "system". But the first of these 
responses is becoming gradually more 
difficult over time. Already when I 
was in prep school our generation of 
students was thought to be radically 
different from that which preceded it. 
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We were excoriated for being 
"cynical" and "negative" (this in the 
last years of the famous "silent 
generation"). We had begun tenta-
tively, but as a group, to reject the 
idea that it is acceptable to enter 
wholeheartedly into a system which 
made overwhelming demands on our 
emotions and our capacities without 
offering in return either any real 
cultural sustenance or any sense of 
autonomy. 
The Law School is intellectually 
stimulating. But when you have been 
competing in deadly earnest since the 
age of ten, submitting constantly to 
your own fear of the teacher's 
disapproval, accepting your own status 
as a non-person, there is a point at 
which no amount of intellectual 
interest will overcome your fear and 
revulsion at the spectacle of the 
professor smiling quietly to himself as 
he prepares to lay your guts out on the 
floor yet once again, paternally. 
Withdrawal, no matter how painful for 
one's carefully nurtured sense that one 
is "a success," is less difficult than to 
submit another time. 
What I am describing is only a 
tendency: many people submit; others 
avoid the experience altogether; others 
go through some half unconscious 
variant. But it is a tendency which has 
been growing steadily for years, and 
sooner or later even the Yale Law 
School will have to recognize it. 
And what of Vietnam and the 
social crisis? It seems to me that their 
main importance has been to provide 
the impetus for the beginning of a 
group rejection of much that is bad 
(and much that is good) in our 
academic culture. Students refuse to 
be enthusiastic not because they are 
"preoccupied" with "non-intellectual" 
issues, but because Vietnam, like most 
other wars, has made young people 
self-conscious, and therefore more 
reluctant than in the past to commit a 
part of themselves which they know to 
be fragile to a process which they 
know to be brutal. 
A social norm is emerging; the 
refusal of enthusiasm is now promoted 
by a large number of indirect social 
pressures. It is unlikely that it will 
disappear with the end of the war or 
some miraculous transformation of the 
urban slums. Active involvement in 
enterprises like the Law School will be 
achieved only by a change in the 
atmosphere of the place itself, by a 
fundamental alteration of the social 
meaning of the behavior of students 
and teachers. 
It should be obvious that the 
expedient of making the Law School 
seem dull to prospective students and 
then picking the less talented over the 
more talented could only delay the 
process of change. The problem is not 
that students do not know whether 
they want to be lawyers. They are not 
sure what kind of people they want to 
be. 
D. Radicalism and Apathy 
The number of students at the 
Law School who would describe 
themselves as "radicals" is small, yet 
their impact over the last two years 
has been great. I would suggest that 
the reason for this is that they are 
practically the only people in the. 
school who have brought into some 
kind of conscious focus the conflicts 
and currents of change described in 
the previous pages. Law School 
radicals in general belong to the 
"activist" rather than the "hippie" 
strain in the youth cultural revolution, 
and as a result they tend to identify 
themselves in terms of their commit-
ment to political and institutional 
change rather than in terms of their 
distinct approach to life. Nonetheless 
they have probably done more to 
expose the underlying problem of 
being at the Law School than to 
improve its institutional structure. 
The radicals denounce "competi-
tion" in general; they have a preoc-
cupation bordering on obsession with 
the problem of "selling out"; they 
criticize the content and organization 
of study at the Law School as 
irrelevant, meaning both that the 
school fails to play a responsible role 
as a catalyst of change in the 
community around it and that it 
reenforces rather than challenges 
tendencies in the students toward 
opportunism and social irresponsi-
bility .1 2 Of course there is nothing 
particularly novel about any of this. 
What makes the radicals important is 
that they have an explanation-albeit a 
simplistic one-and are committed to 
action to bring about change. They 
believe that it is the structure of the 
institution, and especially the 
distribution of power within it, which 
is to blame. A whole life style has been 
built on this promise. 
My objections to the basic 
analysis are altogether conventional 
(worse: they are "liberal"), and 
therefore not worth repeating at 
length here. I simply do not believe 
that either institutional structure, or 
the distribution of power, or for that 
matter the shiboleth of "participa-
tion" are particularly important in 
giving the Law School its peculiar 
atmosphere. The school is too much a 
part of the society around it-both as a 
part of the pipeline by which an elite 
is selected and as a reflection of the 
values of that elite-to be susceptible 
of significant change by "reorganiza-
tion". I think the Law School is on the 
whole a well governed place, 
responsive to what are seen as the 
needs of the students, and that if it 
were possible to formulate a program 
for concrete changes to improve the 
atmosphere, they would be accepted. I 
think the basic problem is a human 
one and endemic to the American 
upper middle class elite as a whole. 
Tinkering with structure is useful in a 
number of ways-to reduce the 
tension, to minimize some of the more 
glaring competitive deformations, to 
open the way for more communica-
tion between students and faculty-
but in no way a substitute for an 
attack on the underlying forms of 
human relations which give the 
structure its meaning. 
But whatever the value of their 
occasional substantive proposals, the 
fact that the radicals have had the 
courage to challenge the Law School 
openly has been of enormous benefit 
to everyone here. What they have done 
is to demonstrate both to faculty and 
students that the manifold deficiencies 
of the institution need not be accepted 
as in some way "inevitable"; and even 
the limited success of their efforts at 
organizing have shown that the 
discontent is far more generalized and 
more serious than had been supposed. 
The combination of their activities 
with what is perceived as a growing 
incapacity of the institution to get 
students excited about the law has led 
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to a general recognition that "some-
thing is happening," even if not as yet 
to any serious attempts on anyone's 
part to respond. 
The faculty response to the 
radicals has thus far been ambivalent. 
On the one hand, their "represen-
tativeness" is constantly challenged, 
and it is implied that they are a mere 
handful of students intoxicated with 
utopian concepts who probably should 
not have been here in the first place. 
On the other, there is a tendency to 
make frequent embarrassed jokes 
about the likelihood of confronta-
tions, an end to "rational discourse," 
mobs, demagoguery, and so forth. The 
constant jokes about revolution 
suggest to me that a number of faculty 
members sense intuitively that under 
the passivity of the classroom there 
must be something more than pure 
boredom, and I think that intuition is 
correct. The radicals are highly 
representative in the sense that their 
active protest expresses feelings which 
almost all students share in one 
complicated variant or another. 
The radicals are representative in 
another way as well. Like the other 
students they have had to come to 
terms with the internal and external 
pressures generated by an educational 
system of which the Law School is 
only a part. They are often as humble, 
earnest and submissive in class as the 
most abandoned of their convention-
ally successful comrades. They differ 
in that instead of constructing 
elaborate "private lives" or "identify-
ing with the aggressor" they have 
begun to construct a sort of "counter-
community" within the Law School, a 
more and more elaborate pattern of 
social, political and even academic 
activities which make the place more 
bearable. The Law School as a whole 
may eventually be a rather different 
place than it has been as a result. 
The radicals have often been 
accused of wanting to abolish original 
sin, of yearning for a "perfect 
institution" which would somehow 
alter the very nature of man. This 
objection seems to me to miss the 
point, and when put in the super-
cilious tone of a bored and sophisti-
cated adult to an idealistic child it is 
offensive. No matter how true it is 
that all of us "make do" and always 
will, it is also true that some ways of 
"making do" are preferred over oth.ers. 
There are a vast number of things 
wrong with the solutions which most 
of us at the Law School (including the 
faculty) find ourselves forced to 
adopt. The radicals want to improve 
the situation. Rather than simply 
putting them down as utopian, it 
might be a good idea for those who 
find their analysis unaccept\lble to 
make their own inquiry into the 
problem. The problem is .there. 
The danger for the radicals seems 
to me to lie in fixating on the 
"system". It seems to me that it is as 
much a mistake to make a social 
construction like the Law School (or 
the United States Government) into a 
bete noire on which one can vent 
hostility as it is to turn the practice of 
corporate law into a "successful 
career" and so justify one's own 
submission. It is true that institutions 
are more than people acting autono-
mously, but it is not true that they are 
themselves animate. It seems to me 
that one gives up something quite real 
when one allows one's emotions to be 
diverted from the work of relating to, 
influencing, and if necessary confront-
ing the people whose conduct is the 
institution. It is often true that the 
"rules" must be changed, but the rules 
are just "things", like money or status; 
there is something unhealthy about 
making them do service for the real 
human objects of aggression and love. 
(It has been suggested that this is 
"legal hippieism." If so, I am a legal 
hippie.) 
However this may be, and even if 
the radicals on the whole are no more 
successful than the other students in 
bringing together in their own minds 
the various emotions and impulses 
provoked by a given situation, there is 
something important to be said for 
them which cannot be said for the 
others. They are aware of a fundamen-
tal problem and committed to using all 
of their faculties to solve it as best 
they can. They tend to accept their 
own psychic reality, and the burden of 
defining themselves in a world made 
up of other psychically real people. For 
this reason, they are likely to be more 
perceptive than their fellow students, 
both about themselves and about the 
people around them. 
III. 
Academic and Professional Values 
Any criticism of the Law School 
which suggests that change is desirable 
is likely to be met by two objections: 
the capacity to turn out highly 
successful professionals must not be 
endangered; and the current organiza-
tion of the School maximizes the 
intellectual quality of the work done 
here. These two arguments would not 
be so formidable if they were not used 
in a sort of "heads I win, tails you 
lose" combinatioi.!_ by proponents of 
the status quo. A proposal put in-
terms of improving the lawyerly 
virtues of the student is met by the 
argument that academic standards are 
all-important. An argument which 
attacks the intellectual shallowness of 
much that is taught here is met by 
appeals to the value of technical 
competence and the "trade school" 
responsibility of the institution. 
I should say at the outset that I 
think the dilemma presented by this 
revolving-door approach is very nearly 
completely illusory. The neat debater's 
point obscures the fact that we know 
very little about what actually 
produces either professional success or 
academic excellence. Moreover, both 
terms are broad enough to encompass 
a large number of experiments. The 
Law School has neither an academic 
nor a professional "temperature" 
which can be exactly measured and 
must be kept from falling by so much 
as a single point. All discussions of the 
kind now joined at the school operate 
implicitly on the assumption that 
there exists a rather wide leeway 
within which changes can be made 
without raising the spectre of 
"debasement" of the education 
offered here. 
A. The Professional Model 
At the outset, it seems best to 
meet the argument occasionally put 
forward that the Law School has no 
business turning out "successful" 
professionals if what is meant by this 
is that it should help staff corporate 
law firms and government agencies 
which are essentially reactionary. The 
argument is that professional success 
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as currently conceived means holding a 
prominent position as a supporter of 
the status quo , giving one's life to 
maintaining the efficiency and 
stability of a corrupt social order. 
Even those graduates who become 
innovative policy makers are seen as 
devoted mainly to preserving the 
existing structure of power and values 
while "accommodating" as much as 
may be necessary. 
For me, the short answer to this is 
that I am not a revolutionary. On a 
more practical level, I do not think a 
revolutionary situation exists in the 
United States t'oday, nor do I think 
such a situation likely in the near 
future. Someone must provide the 
system as it now operates with 
"successful professionals," and 
whoever performs that function has 
enormous power and enormous 
responsibility. What is important to 
me is that that power be exercised as 
well as possible, that it be used to 
improve the human quality of the 
society. I think it desirable for the 
Yale Law School to have a large share 
of this power and this responsibility 
because I think that the institution is 
capable of exercising it well-much 
better than it exercises it now. I 
therefore take as a premise for the 
discussion that the Law School should 
continue to turn out successful 
professionals, in all the.conventional 
meanings of the term. 1 3 I accept thls 
as a limitation on what changes can be 
made in the School. It remains to 
examine the nature of the limitation. 
What do we mean when we say 
that the Law School has the capacity 
to turn out highly successful 
professionals? For students, the basic 
meaning is that they are courted by 
the best law firms, who manage to give 
the impression that there really is 
something special about the Yale LL.B. 
For teachers, there are reports from 
graduates praising the education they 
got, news of the progression of 
graduates from one job to another, 
each better than the last; there is the 
evidence of spectacular success outside 
the legal world, the cumulation of 
honors and places of influence for 
older men, the wielding of real power 
in "staff" and like capacities by the 
young. Finally, there is the strong 
intuitive sense that graduates are 
different when they leave. The 
"bright" ones are honed to a fine edge 
of productivity and flashiness; the 
others have an air of trusty 
competence. 
It seems fairly clear that there are 
two kinds of success which are 
thought to justify the school from a 
professional point of view. First, there 
are the "whiz kids", the contribution 
of Yale to top policy formulation 
(whether as clerks and professors, 
legislative counsels, heads of innova-
tive government programs, Under-
Secretaries of State, business 
innovators). These people are 
co,1ceived of (and I think rightly) as an 
important part of the dynamic 
segment of the American managerial 
elite; they are people who get things 
done, both for them.selves and for vast 
numbers of other people. Second, 
there is the "profession" in a more 
limited sense, the body of practi-
tioners who may also exercise great 
power and achieve great prestige, but 
who are primarily solid lawyer types, 
contributing to the community 
through legal and business skills. They 
are in a sense the "human infra-struc-
ture" essential for the smooth 
operation and orderly progress of a 
great industrial nation-state. 
Why is Yale so successful in 
feeding people into these two related 
elites? First, a goodly number of 
students are destined for success by 
the combination of social position, 
connections, intelligence, and 
vocational bent long before they come 
to Yale. To have gone to Yale is 
important to them in terms of success 
only because it is one of the best last 
items one can have on an educational 
resume. The Law School contributes 
only its name to their progress. For 
others, exposure to the actual 
experience of Law School is very 
important; they grow intellectually 
and emotionally and begin to see what 
they are about in a way which eluded 
them in college. But for many of these 
people, any respectable law school 
would have the same effect. As far as 
their success is concerned, having gone 
to Yale is good for their confidence 
and adds prestige, but if they could 
have gone somewhere else and called it 
Yale, they would be just as well off. 
I think a considerably larger group 
benefits from Yale in ways not 
available at most other schools. But 
for many of them, what is crucial is 
being a member of a student body of 
very high calibre, taught by a faculty 
of higher than normal intelligence. For 
them, it is possible that the School 
could be organized in any one of a 
thousand ways, and so long as there 
was a substantial amount of inter-
change among talented people, the 
result in terms of success would be the 
same. 
My point is not that everything 
but admissions and hiring policy are 
irrelevant. It is that a faculty member 
should think twice before arguing that 
the particular emotional atmosphere 
which dominates the classroom here is 
in some sense essential to the 
production of successful graduates. It 
seern,s clear to me that the emotional 
tone of the Law School does have an 
influence on professional careers, but 
equally clear that to argue for a direct 
positive relationship between it and 
"success" is simplistic. 
Why is it desirable that graduates 
be professionally successful? The 
primary reason is certainly not so that 
they will be rich or happy; nor is it 
that success is what they want. Surely 
the two basic reasons are that on the 
one hand we associate success with a 
quality of work which we find 
desirable for its own sake, and that on 
the other we see that people who are 
conventionally successful at the law 
often have great power to do good or 
evil. It seems to me, anyway, that the 
Law School is justified in emphasizing 
professional success only to the extent 
that that success is beneficial to the 
community. I do not mean by this 
that only the success of "liberals" or 
people of a progressive bent is 
tolerable-in fact I am not talking 
about politics at all. I am talking about 
the underlying qualities of self-aware-
ness and empathy without which the 
exercise of power is likely to be 
arbitrary and destructive, no matter 
how "rational". 
However much I might like to 
make the argument that a change in 
the atmosphere of the Law School 
would have uniquely positive results 
from a professional point of view, it 
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seems clear to me that in one respect 
the emotions generated are "func-
tional". The typical ''successful" law 
student develops qualities of 
personality which are very useful to 
him in climbing to the top of 
bureaucratic organizations: he is 
highly aggressive and competitive in 
relation to his peers and extremely 
submissive toward the authority which 
decrees the structure of his life. I do 
not doubt for a minute that the 
decision, made early in his school 
experience, to handle the problem of 
aggression by accepting all questions 
posed as valid and then trying 
desperately to be first to find the 
"right" answer is of great importance 
throughout his career. 
I am therefore willing to admit 
that the Yale Law School might turn 
out a marginally smaller number of 
Under-Secretaries of State if the 
professors were less hostile and the 
students less passive. But there are still 
two questions to be answered before 
concluding that such a marginal 
change would be for the worse. Would 
the Under-Secretaries who took their 
place be any different? And would the 
Yale graduates who still made it to the 
top of the greasy pole be any better 
than their predecessors? The world is 
full of whiz kid law students lusting to 
be Richard Goodwin. It seems 
inherently unlikely that a more human 
atmosphere at the Yale Law School 
would deprive the Nation in any 
significant way. 
The second question is harder to 
answer. Nonetheless it seems clear to 
me that the personal costs of turning 
oneself into a successful law student 
type are professional costs as well. Of 
course it is impossible to be "success-
ful" within the system without 
accepting it to some extent. Yet there 
are a large variety of ways to accept, 
and submission, passivity anchored by 
a faith in one's "private life" to keep 
one somehow uncorrupted, seems to 
me a poor way. If there is anything at 
all to be said (and I think there is) for 
the institutions within which law 
students are successful, it seems to me 
to be that they admit of creative 
manipulation and change. If one is to 
approach them divided within oneself, 
it seems to me best that the division 
should be openly over their value, 
their future, their quality as places for 
people to act, and not over whether 
one can tolerate "selling out" to them 
if one has enough private sustenance. 
The profession (here meaning the 
whole gamut of activities dominated 
by lawyers) and the national 
constituency it serves would be better 
off if approached with less fear, less 
distortion of the self, by those who are 
supposed to be its life blood. 
So far, the discussion has been in 
terms of the whiz kids. The case that 
the profession suffers as a result of the 
atmosphere of law school is easier to 
make when we turn to those students 
who the faculty conceives as cut out 
for more conventional kinds of 
professional success. First, it seems 
abundantly clear that the reaction of 
complete withdrawal and cynicism 
about the law which characterizes a 
very substantial number of students 
can hardly be professionally produc-
tive. What they learn of the law while 
refusing to admit that it has any 
interest for them could certainly be as 
well conveyed by a far inferior faculty. 
It is hard to imagine that a decision to 
abate the terror in the first year 
classroom could have anything but 
good effects on their purely technical 
competence. 
But the professional problem goes 
much deeper. Students who are not in 
any way excited by the Law School 
can learn the techniques of the 
particular branch of the law they 
choose after they enter practice, and 
the only bad result will be that they 
will reproach the school with failure to 
give them a sufficiently "practical" 
education. It is much harder for 
anyone actually engaged in practice to 
take the time to make the far more 
difficult and frustrating investigations 
into "abstract" or even "philosoph-
ical" aspects of the law which make it 
more than a set of "neutral" 
techniques. Yet these investigations 
are much more than a "luxury" for 
the professional. While it is true that it 
takes little reflection to be able to find 
out how many directors are needed to 
form a corporation in Connecticut, it 
is equally true that conventionally 
successful lawyers perform profes-
sional functions that go far beyond the 
technicalities of their practice. Law 
professors spend a great deal of time 
thinking about the larger questions 
those functions involve. It is too bad 
that their approach to teaching and to 
community life in general makes it 
almost impossible for them to get their 
thoughts across to the great majority 
of their students. 
The irony of this is that many 
professors defend courses which they 
admit are not stimulating intellectually 
on the ground that they are necessary 
to give a minimum of professional 
competence. In fact, most of those 
courses are not of a "nuts and bolts" 
type at all: they are a compromise 
between the theoretical interests of 
the teacher and a vague catalogue of 
areas of expertise. The result is that 
the student who is unable to face up 
to the professor's theoretical 
assault-often as incoherent as it is 
aggressive-has to fall back on a very 
meagre residue of ''practically useful" 
content, almost all of which he will 
have to relearn anyway if he is ever 
confronted with a similar case in 
practice. 
And what of the famous 
"developme~t of analytical skills"? 
Does it take place? More than would 
take place for the same people in 
another kind of school? Taught by a 
different method? I must admit I find 
the evidence for this virtue of a legal 
education too sparse for serious 
discussion. The one thing that is clear 
is that the analytical capacity of many 
students is far, far greater outside class 
than it is in. If our minds are really 
being "honed" it seems clear to me 
that it is happening in the library, or in 
conversations with other students, or 
very occasionally with teachers out of 
class, and always under the terrific 
handicap created by an oppressive 
emotional atmosphere. 
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B. The Academic Model 
While most people at the Law 
School would place about equal 
emphasis on the professional and 
strictly academic functions of the 
school, there are a few professors and 
a few students who clearly give 
priority to the "intellectual" side. I am 
one of them. It seems to me that the 
academic virtues largely although not 
entirely subsume the professional or 
"training" ones, so that students are 
best served by keeping the nuts and 
bolts work to a minimum. There are, 
however, a number of conclusions not 
uncommonly drawn from this 
academic model with which I strongly 
disagree. 
There is a tendency to justify 
almost everything about the institu-
tion as required for the maintenance 
of its very high academic standards. 
Before examining the conclusions 
drawn from this vaunted excellence, it 
seems well to briefly explore its 
reality. 
It seems to me that when looked 
at as a whole the Yale Law School fails 
miserably to live up to its academic 
and intellectual pretensions. Some 
courses are superb; others are really 
terrible. The great majority represent 
an honest effort ending in mediocrity 
or intellectual shallowness. Students 
who love the law can always salvage 
something; if nothing else, they can 
derive nourishment from the problems 
presented by teachers who fail to 
follow up or even fully understand 
what they are saying. But most 
students do not particularly love the 
law; after the first semester they get 
little more from class than they could 
from a good horn book. 
I do not think the problem derives 
either from lack of intelligence among 
teachers or from lack of application on 
their part. I think law professors as a 
group are going through a "trough", 
largely as a result of the failure of a 
number of intellectual and political 
experiments of the last three decades, 
and find it difficult to respond 
creatively to the law as an academic 
subject. What is altogether absent from 
the Law School is the feeling of 
intellectual tension which comes of 
the confrontation of ideas in the 
process of growth. Yale notoriously 
had this quality in the 1930's. Harvard 
College had it in the early sixties. 
An interest in applying the 
concepts of a variety of fields to 
poverty law or land law is no 
substitute for creativity. Nor is even 
the most monumental expertise in an 
aspect of the law as it exists. What is 
needed is a feeling of the existence of 
problems unexplored not because no 
one has bothered to think of them but 
because the light of a new theory has 
only recently been turned on them. 
What is needed is a feeling that for 
once a piece of doctrine will be 
challenged from a new direction rather 
than confronted for the thousandth 
time with some well known counter-
vailing principle. The law school 
classroom is strewn with the corpses of 
ideas that did not succeed, of new 
approaches that no one took up. The 
teacher seems to be saying at each 
moment "I know there is nowhere to 
go along this line. I haven't much to 
say, but it's all there is." 
The conclusion drawn by even the 
most talented students is terribly 
depressing: work interstitially, unearth 
something, apply simple logic where 
no one has thought to before. It is 
extraordinarily simple to be "brilliant'.' 
once you get the hang of it: look for 
the "dilemmas", "key value choices", 
and the areas where institutional 
competency is in question. All the rest 
is memorization. 1 4 "This cuts against 
that." "When you unpack this 
concept ... " are the key phrases. The 
teacher who asks for more is simply a 
tough grader. After a certain amount 
of this, the impression grows that the 
law is without what could properly be 
called theoretical or philosophical 
problems. There are only "conflicting 
principles", factors to be "balanced", 
and problems to be "left" to this, that 
or the other institution, and the 
process by which that institution 
reaches its decision is somehow 
irrelevant to an understanding of the 
law. 
It has come to be recognized that 
"political economy" is now extinct. 
What was once the most exciting of 
the behavioral sciences is now the 
territory of technicians executing the 
practical decisions of "policy makers", 
for which read "politicians". The law 
as an academic subject could have as 
much vitality as economics ever did. I 
am an optimist: it seems to me that at 
Yale this could be achieved by asking 
"Why" over and over again rather than 
stopping as soon as the piece of legal 
behavior being studied has been 
"unpacked" into a neat little pile of 
"values" to be "balanced". What 
makes me so sure of this is that some 
teachers do it, although even they tend 
to disguise the process, as though they 
were afraid they would lose the 
students' interest the minute it became 
clear that something more than a 
particularly confusing exposition of 
"the law" was going on. 
In the classroom all of this 
manifests itself in a pervading vice: the 
unstated assumption. It is assumed 
that all students share those assump-
tions, or that students are not worth 
arguing with about assumptions, or 
perhaps there is an unawareness of 
how important the assumptions 
actually are. There is virtually never a 
conscious effort to build two models 
based on different principles, or even 
to see how one set of principles will 
run through a large body of law to 
create a series of results quite different 
from those arrived at either piecemeal 
or by a different approach. 
Students rapidly get used to this 
approach. They are passive to start 
with; they want to please. After a 
while they tend to be deeply 
apologetic, to their fellow students as 
well as to the teacher, whenever they 
appear to be raising a really fundamen-
tal question about what is going on. 
Since nothing of any great interest is 
offered, students become eager to "get 
on with it"; the objective is to 
accumulatP. as many nuggets of 
pseudo-concrete "knowledge", or 
rather as much knowledge of the 
teacher's "views" as is possible in the 
hour. It is no wonder that years of thi"s 
eventually produce a feeling of both 




Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 1 [1971], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol1/iss1/7
85 
One response has been the student 
demand for "relevance". In one sense 
this is no more than a plea by a 
particular group of students for work 
in particular fields of the law which 
interest them. On this level it is very 
much like any other request for a 
change in the curriculum. But the 
request has another meaning as well, it 
represents a demand for stimulation 
which is shared by many students who 
have no overwhelming interest in 
urban law as a discrete field. It would 
seem to me to be desirable that the 
debate about ·'relevance" carried on 
between the radicals and the faculty 
should go beyond the question of 
whether or not the radicals will get 
faculty time and money devoted to 
the projects which interest them. 
Unless a broader challenge is made, the 
courses in urban law or whatever will 
be no more interesting than the 
courses currently taught in similarly 
practical fields (e.g. various aspects of 
commercial law). 
What of the argument that things 
must be as they are at the Law School 
because that is necessary to maintain 
its high academic standards? The 
argument has two branches. The first 
is that the Law School simply admits 
the "brightest" students, hires the 
most "brilliant" teachers, and then lets 
the teachers teach "exactly what they 
want." Ergo, the Law School has the 
highest possible academic standards, 
and anyone who might want to change 
any of the three policies in any way 
would, practically by definition, be 
betraying the ideal of intellectual 
excellence. 
This is sophistic even for a law 
professor. Both "bright" and 
"brilliant" are terms defined in 
practice through a complicated set of 
criteria, all of which shift over time, 
and each one of which represents a set 
of judgments about "relevance" of 
exactly the sort discussed above. 
"Brilliant" professors, for example, are 
very young men who have gotten 
smashing grades in law school, clerked, 
written a few law review articles, and 
perhaps practiced for a year or two. 
They may indeed be the best people 
one could possibly find for the job; it 
may be true that any other way of 
hiring teachers is hopeless; but it is 
ridiculous to suggest that they are 
selected by some simple standard of 
"brilliance". 
The idea that te<rehers teach 
"exactly what they want to" at the 
Law School is equally vacuous. This is 
supposed to mean that no one is 
"coerced" into teaching a course. The 
chairman of the Curriculum Commit-
tee has explained with admirable 
ambiguity that its function is to 
"make sure" that the basic courses 
which all agree ought to be taught are 
taught. This is achieved, without 
"coercion", by, guess what, "persua-
sion"! It is perfectly clear that the 
faculty accepts a large responsibility, 
both individually and as a group, to 
make sure that the curriculum meets 
some standard of depth, diversity, etc. 
I have not the slightest doubt that if 
the students and faculty come to feel 
that serious reform in course offerings 
and teaching techniques is needed, 
there will be a gradual response to the 
new consensus without it being 
necessary to keel-haul anyone. 
The second branch of the 
academic model argument can be 
summarized as "A teacher has to break 
some eggs to make an academic 
omelette." The idea is that teachers at 
the Law School treat students as their 
exact intellectual equals, this being the 
most efficient way toward truth, and 
that if some students are not up to the 
challenge, that is an unfortunate 
sacrifice to be made in the name of 
intellectual progress. If the teachers 
pampered the students, standards 
would be lowered (bad points might 
sneak by unnoticed in class). 
The simple answer here is that 
teachers virtually never treat students 
as their intellectual equals in class. The 
Law School is a "community of 
scholars" only in the sense that 
students on the Law Review are 
treated as promising junior versions of 
faculty members; for the rest of the 
students the roles of professor and 
student are carefully defined in every 
encounter, and there is not even a 
suggestion that they might be 
transcended at the intellectual level. I 
do not think this is bad, although the 
extent of the discrimination in favor 
of success(= good grades) is rather 
sickening. The idea that the basic 
problem will be solved by "unstruc-
turing" student/faculty contact strikes 
me as utopian. A far more important 
objective is to see to it that within 
their respective roles students and 
faculty treat each other decently. 
There is no question in my mind 
that the Yale Law School is one of the 
best in the country. There is also 
no question that as an academic 
institution it greatly lessens its own 
effectiveness by perpetuating an 
atmosphere which makes it difficult 
for its students to be academically 
creative. Great stores of academic 
talent are wasted when students 
respond to that atmosphere by 
withdrawal; other talents are turned 
toward relatively sterile approaches 
and are impoverished by the demands 
of a particularly emotionally depleting 
kind of "success". 1 5 
IV. Conclusion 
If there is "revolution" in the air, 
it is not primarily institutional, but 
psychic territory which is at stake, or 
the whole thing is a waste of time. 
November 17, 1968 
Postscript 
Since I wrote the paper repro-
duced above, students at just about 
every "national" law school in the 
country have begun to agitate-often 
successfully-for various kinds of 
changes in school structure. I have no 
more faith now than a year ago in the 
substantive efficacy of "tinkering", 
but I have been persuaded that by the 
very act of organization the activists 
are bringing beneficial psychological 
changes. Most important, students and 
faculty in the elite schools have begun 
to express their emotions at.least a 
little, and while this may be disturb-
ing, indeed-sometimes terrifying, to all 
concerned, I think it is a step in the 
right direction. As for the analysis 
above, I think it still holds, but would 
like to add, without attempting to 
integrate, two observations. 
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Ambivalence and Projection: HLA, 
HLSN, HLSU, SHLSU. 
There are a large number of 
students at the Law School (perhaps as 
much as 30 or 40 per cent of the 
student body) who feel a strong and 
unpleasant ambivalence about 
practicing law for a conventional law 
firm. This combination of attraction 
and repulsion toward the traditional 
notion of professional "success" is 
matched by a similar and symmetrical 
ambivalence felt toward such 
alternatives as a life devoted to 
poverty law, radical activism, or what 
is vaguely conceived as "being 
creative." A number of students who 
feel these conflicts resolve them 
superficially by a characteristic Hip 
Law Student's Neurosis which leads to 
a characteristic Hip Law Student's 
Unhappiness. 
Hip Law Student's Neurosis 
(HLSN) consists in projecting one's 
feelings of attraction to conventional 
private practice and one's feelings of 
repulsion toward a life of insecure 
self-sacrifice onto one's fellow 
students. Once this has been effected, 
the HLS is-as far as he can tell-left 
only with feelings of attraction to 
activist or aesthetic self-sacrifice and 
feelings of repulsion toward conven-
tional practice. The characteristic form 
_of expression of a person suffering 
from HLSN is denunciation of the 
careerism, opportunism, sterile 
legalism, and devotion to mindless 
studying of his classmates combined 
with assertion of his determination to 
follow his own feelings in the direction 
of "some other kind of life." 
HLSN produces a variety of ironic 
misperceptions of the Law School, 
two of which are particularly worthy 
of note. The first is Library Syndrome. 
The HLS is firmly, indeed categori-
cally and dogmatically, convinced that 
the library is at all times filled with a 
mass of students devoting themselves 
virtually without rest to academic 
success. This mass of careerist students 
is conceived as truly phenomenal in its 
passion for all that is most sterile, 
technical, abstruse, and boring about 
the law. The HLS will argue that 
exactly because of this devotion to the 
pedantic, the careerist majority is 
learning a great deal of law which he 
himself is constitutionally incapable of 
learning, and is therefore destined to a 
conventional legal success which-he is 
proud to say-he could not have if he 
wanted it. Library Syndrome is 
exposed if one stops to think that all 
the HLS's spend some time in the 
library, which is too small to hold 
more than a fraction of the student 
body at any given time. Enough 
students, from all groups within the 
student body, pass enough fractions of 
their time there to constantly keep it 
full. But the mass of industrious 
students simply does not exist: if the 
HLS spent several consecutive days in 
the library he would realize that its 
fullness is the result of constant 
turnover. 
A similar misperception applies to 
classes. The HLS will assert that the 
industrious mass is composed of 
people who go to class and make 
sterile, legalistic interventions in search 
of teacher approval. Yet the HLS 
himself will admit to going to class 
occasionally, and to raising his hand to 
make a sterile, legalistic statement. 
After all, since that's what people who 
go to class do and appreciate, there 
would be no point in his trying to 
behave any differently. As with the 
library, the mass of industrious 
careerist students is an illusion created 
by a mass of HLS's all behaving as 
they think they must-or might as 
well-given the hopeless corruption of 
their peers. 
HLSN produces a particular kind 
of unhappiness (HLSU): a combina-
tion of loneliness, distrust of other 
students, and anxiety about the 
future. Loneliness is the immediate 
result of projection, since the 
projection defines virtually all other 
students as tainted with the selfish-
ness, blindness, opportunism, etc. 
which the projector has escaped. The 
fact that the HLS lives characteristic-
ally in small groups of other HLS's, 
and that these groups spend most of 
their time expressing their feelings of 
alienation from the illusory mass of 
careerists does not lessen loneliness. 
Some HLS's will simply emphasize 
how tiny their group is, what a 
forsaken island in the sea of three-
piece-suited potential Wall Streeters. 
Others put forward an argument which 
illustrates perfectly the deep distrust 
which HLSN produces, a distrust 
which in turn reenforces the neurosis. 
A sophisticated HLS will point 
out that in spite of the fact that a very 
large number of his fellow students go 
around sounding like HLS's, denounc-
ing the careerism of the vast mass of 
the student body, it is nonetheless true 
that after graduation a large propor-
tion of these pseudo-HLS's actually 
renounce their alienation and integrate 
themselves in the most abandoned 
fashion into conventional practice. 
The sophisticated HLS will adduce 
from this incontestable fact that in 
any group of avowed HLSs there are a 
large number of traitors, masquer-
aders, men of little faith and shoddy 
fibre who will desert the cause at the 
first opportunity. The sophisticated 
HLS therefore suffers from a 
particularly acute form of unhappiness 
(SHLSU): he is surrounded not only 
by careerism but also by hypocrisy. 
Anxiety about the future caused 
by deep and multiple ambivalence is at 
the root of HLSN, and the projection 
which causes loneliness and distrust 
does not eliminate that anxiety. This is 
the true misfortune, and one to be 
taken seriously, of the HLS. HLSN has 
in a sense taken the place of the 
passionate assertions of cynicism and 
detachment which ambitious students 
in the 1950'soften put forward when 
confronted by situations which evoked 
guilt about "selling out." The HLS 
does not even succeed in buying time 
before confronting the inevitable 
choices; he is likely to be too anxious 
and too distracted by the Law School 
to engage in serious creative work or in 
serious political activism outside the 
academic community. HLSU is usually 
paralyzing. 
Is there a solution? Of course not. 
But it does seem to me that the Law 
School would be more interesting and 
more healthy if students took to 
public discussion of their own 
conflicts over what is a morally 
acceptable way of life, rather than 
exhorting their friends to an imaginary 
virtue while denouncing everyone else 
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Faculty Time and 
the Consumer Revolt 
When students and professors talk 
about the crisis in legal education, or 
about a particular crisis in the Law 
School, they are likely to concentrate 
on what they see as the substantive 
issues: e.g. reform of the grading 
system, student participation in school 
government, curricular reform, and so 
forth. There are groups within the law 
school for whom these are issues of 
intense concern in and of themselves, 
but one of the ironies of situation 
after situation is that people who 
would say it was beneath them to be 
passionate about such trivialities find 
themselves taking passionate positions 
about them. I would suggest that the 
reason for this is that such issues mask 
a deeper issue which is indeed of 
passionate concern: the distribution of 
faculty time among different pursuits, 
with everything that entails for the 
distribution of emotional satisfactions 
among the groups which make up the 
law school community. 
From the point of view of the 
faculty, the most important fact about 
their time is that they must limit the 
amount of it they supply to students. 
Many faculty members would agree 
with this on the simple ground that 
they are so few and the students so 
many, but there is more to it than 
that. A number of factors make it 
important to limit the supply to an 
amount considerably below that it 
could be given the existing 
faculty/student ratio. A first point is 
that many faculty members apparently 
feel that they have "bought" a certain 
amount of "free" time by becoming 
professors and thereby sacrificing the 
large incomes they might have made in 
private practice. This "free" time is 
seen as a sort of "contractual" right, 
and its quantity determined by 
"expectations" on joining the faculty. 
This is pretty silly, but there you are. 
A second reason for limiting time 
devoted to students is that professors 
tend to conceive of themselves as far 
more than teachers-they feel 
themselves to be eminently qualified 
by their intelligence and savvy as 
generalist contributors to a wide 
variety of policy-making processes. 
Such an allocation µiay or may not be 
an efficient one. It is unfortunate that 
it seems to arise at least in part from 
two kinds of calculation. First, the 
.Professor who owes his position to 
demonstration of his own superiority 
to the run-of-the-mill law students 
who were his classmates is unlikely to 
think that the run of the mill of 
students have anything at all to offer 
him. It is a characteristic vice of law 
review editors that they think of most 
other Jaw students as "mini-
minds. "16 Second, the prestige 
derived from consulting and dilettan-
tish policy-making is one of the 
commodities professors "buy" by 
sacrificing Wall Street income. The 
issue of the scholarly output of the 
faculty will be considered after 
examining student demand. 
The student demand for faculty 
time, given the existing structure of 
the Jaw school, is practically un-
limited-professors could spend all 
their waking hours with students and 
still leave them unsatisfied. The main 
reason for this is probably the 
extraordinary sterility of current 
teaching techniques. Offered the 
chance, students as individuals 
naturally attempt to obtain from 
professors the emotional and 
intellectual nutriment-approval, 
encouragement, and also ideas-which 
they are denied in class. The situation 
would be less desperate if students at 
the Law School were not products of 
sterile techniques at lower levels in the 
educational system, but in the current 
state of things it is simply unreal to 
expect any large number of students 
to be either intellectually or emotion-
ally self-sufficient. And the situation is 
aggravated by the rationing system 
about to be described, since the very 
short supply of faculty time makes it a 
particularly desirable item. 
Given the limited supply and the 
unlimited demand for time, a rationing 
system is inevitable. What was peculiar 
about the Law School's system in the 
past was that it functioned so 
perfectly that all parties were able to 
deny that it existed. The elements are 
implicit in the psychological phenome-
na described in the earlier parts of this 
paper: the vast majority of students 
were persuaded that because of their 
academic inadequacy they had no 
valid claim on any faculty time outside 
of the classroom. Conversely, members 
of the Law Journal and a few others 
were persuaded that they were 
virtually peers of the faculty and 
.therefore could draw at will. The 
result was a balance so neat that many 
faculty were able to maintain an 
"open door" policy: they could afford 
to talk to any student who dropped by 
secure in the knowledge that they 
would never be swamped. 
It is worth dweiling for a moment 
on the neatness of this institutional 
solution. Everyone's conception of 
himself is reenforced, and therefore 
there is a tendency toward stability. 
The classroom experience of most 
students convinces them that any 
relationship with a faculty member is 
hopeless, and that it is necessary to 
seek sustenance altogether outside the 
Law School. There is no interference 
with these students' tendency to "turn 
off" the law altogether. Elite students 
on the other hand improve their 
competitive position through faculty 
contact and become even more elite. 
They tend more and more to identify 
with the faculty and with the system, 
which appears to follow what amount 
to laws of nature. The faculty member 
is able to conceive of himself as 
fulfilling his teaching responsibilities-
after all, his door is open to any 
student at almost any time-while in 
fact having contact only with a 
student elite not numerous enough to 
disrupt his schedule. Academic life 
is truly beautiful as long as most 
students will accept something less 
than what they pay for. 
The faculty's impression that they 
were not really rationing their time 
devoted to students-or doing so only 
to a very limited extent-reenforced 
the tendency of professors to think of 
their free time as a contractual right, 
something inherent in their positions. 
In such a situation, a number of other 
developments take on special 
significance. It seems perfectly 
permissible that numerous professors 
should serve only part time, devoting 
themselves mainly to affairs in the 
"real world". The fact that faculty 
members never eat in the student 
dining hall can also be accepted as 
perfectly natural. In the absence of a 
17
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perceived rationing problem it has no 
significance at all. Finally, the limited 
scholarly output of the faculty as a 
group is a matter only for gentle irony 
at the expense of colleagues. That the 
average professor's life work consists 
of perhaps two hundred printed pages, 
a couple of Reports to Commissions to 
Study the Causes of Almost Anythiµg, 
and a handful of appellate briefs is a 
matter of little moment if alternative 
uses of faculty time are not apparent. 
But the rationing system is 
disintegrating and a "Consumer 
Revolt" has begun. First, there is the 
general disintegrating of "competitive-
ness", the partial but nonetheless 
important impact on the Law School 
of long range changes in the culture of 
young people. There is the diffusion of 
interests resulting from the politiciza-
tion of life in the school, and the 
consequent decline of the Law Journal 
from its position of dominance as the 
ne plus ultra in prestige among 
students. Most important, a series of 
"crises" have permitted students to 
voice the demand for time outside of 
the established academic structures. In 
the jargon of the moment, the old 
system of entitlements to time has lost 
its "legitimacy". 
This began to be apparent in the 
movement for grade reform. It seems 
to me that one of the more important, 
although one of the least expressed 
reasons for demanding the elimination 
of letter grades was that they 
symbolized the denial of time to the 
mass of students. It was said over and 
over again that the grades were 
"meaningless", that they expressed 
nothing which could be useful to the 
student except in his role as competi-
tor with other students, that they were 
the basis for an elitist system. In short, 
grades symbolized the absolutely 
minimal extent of the involvement 
which the faculty was willing to suffer 
for the average student, and at the 
same time the faculty's determination 
to select a group of favorites on whom 
involvement would be lavished. 
The application of this notion to 
the demand for student participation 
in decision-making is obvious, and 
helps to explain the chronic lack of 
"substantive" proposals for change to 
accompany the demand for "power". 
But a more interesting phenomenon is 
the perpetual cry for more "communi-
cation" between students and faculty. 
It is important that it is students who 
raise this cry, and particularly students 
who find themselves, somewhat to 
their surprise, supporting activist 
initiatives which express an antago-
nism toward the faculty that they 
barely knew they felt. In fact, 
"communication" seems to be 
constant, and productive. The rapidity 
with which different points of view are 
disseminated is one of the great 
strengths of the Law School, and one 
reason for its at least relative success in 
adjusting itself to changing student 
demands. But no amount of political 
communication will substitute for the 
communication which is really 
desired-that of student and teacher in 
a setting undistorted by the fear and 
anger of the law school classroom. 
That it is time that is at stake, and 
the involvement which time symbol-
izes, also helps to explain the 
surprising intensity of the anxiety each 
successive "crisis" evokes in the 
faculty. The passionate arguments 
from "principle", dire predictions of 
institutional decline, threats of 
departure, result in part from a 
vaguely sensed threat to a central part 
of the Yale Law professor's status: his 
extraordinarily limited teaching 
responsibilities. This threat is 
reenforced in a curious way by the 
very institution of crisis: all the hours 
spent making those appeals to 
"principle", all the cleverness 
expended in transforming vested 
interests into "contractual rights"; is 
perforce subtracted from the very free 
time that was to be protected. Because 
the issue of professional responsibility, 
the issue of time, is never raised 
directly, the inherent self-contradic-
tion in the faculty's approach to 
consumer revolt is never confronted. 
The result is a pervasive frustration; 
often faculty members seem as 
annoyed with each other for wasting 
each other's time as they are with the 
students. 
The professorial fantasy of a 
life devoted entirely to faculty 
meetings called to deal with student 
demands is no more than a fantasy. 
But until someone begins to evolve a 
new set of rules governing the supply 
of faculty time and its distribution, it 
seems likely that recurrent crises will 
keep that fantasy constantly at the 
back of the mind. 
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I. After I began writing this paper, I ran across the following, which 
neatly sums up my approach: 
Dilettantism 
"Though I lack a philosophical, sociological, historical and 
political education, I do not cease to meditate upon philosophy, 
sociology, history and politics. Consequently, it must be admitted 
that whatever I turn over in my mind may bear the mark of 
incorrectness. Besides, my afterthoughts are consistently inconsist-
ent with these disciplines as disciplines .... Yet, assuming that both 
my premises and my conclusions are hazy and precarious, I 
nevertheless write them down, and fill them out with simple human 
experience. For it has never been proved that a dilettante has 
nothing to say." 
L. Tyrmand, "Reflections," The New Yorker, Nov. 9, 1968. 
2. The following is quoted from A Tribute to Henry E. Spring-
meyer (1901-1968), 42 So. Cal. L. Rev. 2 (1969): 
"Professor Springmeyer was devoted to the cause of legal 
education. His tough minded approach to law, and especially to 
torts, which he taught for over twenty years, commanded a special 
kind of respect. Veterans who had faced the enemy under fire 
during two wars trembled before his outrage at fuzzy thinking. The 
experience of being called on to recite a case is etched indelibly in 
the memory of every student. There was the scraping of the chair as 
one rose to his feet; the struggle to stand at his de~k yet still read 
the carefully prepared brief. The fear of a less than perfect 
performance led more than one first year student to feel that, had 
William Pitt been taught by Professor Springmeyer, Pitt's famed 
expression might well have read 'where law begins tyranny begins.' 
"After the long uneasiness of the first year, students could 
reflect upon Professor Springmeyer's integrity, his energy, his 
tough-mindedness, his devotion to the law, and his sense of 
responsibility to the embryo lawyers he faced. Those of us who had 
called him our teacher began later to appreciate in full how his 
dedication cost him and how it enriched us. 
"Those of us who called him also colleague and friend were 
impressed by other attributes .... " 
It might appear that even on the most superficial reading it is 
apparent that Professor Springmeyer belonged to a generation of 
law teachers now almost wholly disappeared. References to standing 
in class, "carefully prepared briefs," and student "reflections" upon 
their ,professors' god-like virtues clearly mark the time-period 
described as The Past Utopian. Professors to whom I have shown the 
passage are quick to point this out, perhaps with a nostalgic chuckle 
and an intimation that students these days have life easy. Oddly 
enough, students seem to react quite differently: they tend to miss 
the element of anachronism altogether and to focus on the accuracy 
of the description of their own emotional experience. 
3. Watson, "The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological 
Aspects of Legal Education," 37 Cine. L. Rev. 91 ( 1968). 
4. See R. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Tota/ism 
(1963). 
5. After reading this far, a friend wrote the following marginal 
comment: "Compare with (talk about) fantastic passivity of 
teaching profession-the effete English professor. The unconstruc-
tiveness of what law teachers do, i.e. criticism. Criticism= the law 
professor's nihilism. Also, law teachers are not great men. They are 
not Dean Rusk or even Sol Linowitz, though they might have 
been." 
6. The elements of fear: (a) the teacher will ridicule you; (b) the 
teacher will disapprove of you; (c) fellow students will ridicule you; 
(d) fellow students will disapprove; (e) the teacher will not deal with 
material in a comprehensible way; (f) the teacher will demonstate to 
you that you didn't understand the material when you studied it; 
(g) the teacher will raise issues which will frighten you because you 
haven't dealt with them before; (h) the teacher will discover you 
have not studied the material assigned. I will consider below the 
reaction which this kind of experience evokes in different kinds of 
students. 
7. "When my little patient assumed the active role, roaring like a 
lion and laying about him with the rod and the knife, he was 
dramatizing and forestalling the punishment which he feared." A. 
Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense 124 (1946). 
8. Nachman, "Childhood Experience and Vocational Choice in 
Law, Dentistry and Social Work," 7 J. Counsel Psychology 243 
(1960). 
9. E. Erikson, Childhood and Society {1963); Young Man 
Luther (1962). 
I 0. Since this was written, the Law School has changed its grading 
system. Grades at the end of the first semester are now on a pass-fail 
basis. 
11. E. Friedenberg, Coming of Age in America: The Vanishing 
Adolescent ( 1963). 
12. Radical criticisms of the Law School on this score seem to have 
been almost universally misunderstood by the Faculty. (I think 
largely as a result of an extreme defensiveness combined with pride 
in a professional ability to disintegrate an "adversary's" point into 
something unattractive.) It is not being suggested that the Law 
School should adopt a policy of Orwellian indoctrination aimed at 
turning the students into political activists committed to the SOS 
line. The point is simply that any law school spends much of its 
time trying to interest students in particular legal issues, and that 
the choice of which issues to emphasize has social consequences. In 
a· Business Units course, for example, a teacher may choose to 
emphasize the problems of social justice involved in the doctrine of 
fiduciary relations, and no one (almost no one) will accuse him of 
attempts to impose a particular political point of view. The radicals 
are suggesting that in the mass of the curriculum too little attention 
is focused on the myriad problems of social justice involved in the 
body of American law. This is hardly reason for paranoia on the 
part of the Faculty. 
13. It is equally necessary that someone turn out radical ,challengers 
of all the underpinnings of the system. I think this is a function of 
the Law School as well. I don't think there need be a serious 
conflict. 
14. The banality and shallowness of the standard "intellectually 
excellent" technique of analysis practiced in law schools is 
wonderfully illustrated by an article entitled "Ten Precepts for Law 
Book and Law Review Writing" which appeared in the Journal of 
Legal Education over fifteen years ago. As summarized by the 
author, the first eight precepts are: I. Do a little every day. 2. Finish 
provisionally a section or chapter at a time. 3. Use short words and 
short sentences. 4. Work directly with the legal raw material itself. 
5. Arrange the subject matter in systematic order. 6. Aim to inform 
the court. 7. Express your own ideas. 8. Master the pertinent facts. 
The legal writer who has grasped all this is ready to move on to two 
final rules, worth quoting at length: 
"9. Grasp the functional perspective to point the way. 
"In my own experience, I have found it very helpful in trying 
to analyze and organize material for presentation in law books to 
ask this question: What is the function served by the branch of the 
law with which I am dealing? ... 
"What the conduct was, what harm it caused, and to whom; 
these are factual questions. Whether the actor or the victim should, 
in the given type of case, take the chances and bear the burden of 
harm involves matters of policy. In other words, it involves a 
weighing or balancing of various conflicting interests. On these 
matters of policy relating to balancing of conflicting interests, there 
are often sharp and deep-seated differences of opinion ... 
''Decision either way in these matters of policy actually does 
involve, wittingly or unwittingly, decision upon the relative weight 
or importance of the underlying conflicting interests involved. For 
intelligent decision one way or the other (sic) these policy matters, 
in doubtful cases, the court needs to be informed by counsel not 
only what these underlying conflicting interests are, but also what 
are their relative weights in the scale of social values that it is proper 
to apply. 
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"IO. Find the ultimate guides to policy decisions in weighing of 
conflicting interests in scales of recognizable criteria of justice. 
"Individual interests often conflict with each other. Individual 
interests can also conflict with social interests, under whatever label 
of public policy or general welfare the social interests may be 
expressed. What interests, individual or social, are in the instance 
involved? Which of these interests, i.n the instance, outweigh other 
conflicting interests in the scale of social values that is to be 
applied? In the process of appraisal, what scale of social values is 
properly to be applied? 
"Solution of these policy questions thus involves much more 
than mere scrutiny of detailed physical facts. In this regard, it is not 
even enough merely to inform the court what the conflicting 
interests are. The relative importance, in the instance of these 
conflicting interests, is involved in what the court must determine in 
reaching its decision. For that purpose, the court must be adequa-
tely informed regarding what standard of right and wrong, what 
criterion of justice or injustice, it is proper in the instance to apply. 
"Here is involved a vital portion of the age-old question, "What 
is Justice?" This question involves the ends or objectives to be 
achieved in the legal ordering of human relations. The basic problem 
of what ends or objectives are to be achieved can be illustrated, but 
not for any particular occasion settled, by a variety of familiar 
contrasting terms. Among these terms are truth or falsehood, 
stability or change, rule or discretion, plenty or scarcity, production 
or restriction, competition or regulation, free enterprise or 
regimentation, liberty or security, war or peace, freedom or slavery. 
"Adequately to inform the court what bearing such underlying 
basic problems have upon proper decision of a case currently before 
the court may tax the talent and resourcefulness of any lawyer. 
Whether or not the court is in the instance adequately informed, 
however, the ends or objectives of law often are to greater or less 
extent involved in current decisions. The court's choice between 
available alternatives is normally governed by what it believes to be 
right. It is the lawyer's job so to inform the court that the court can 
see what is right." 
Vold, "Ten Precepts for Law Book and Law Review Writing," 
6 J. Leg. Ed. 373 (1954). (Footnotes in the original have been 
omitted.) 
Got it? Well, you don't have to actually get it. It is self-contra-
dictory or at least obscure. But just learn to sound as though you've 
got it and everything will be fine. 
IS. I include here a quotation from a review of a book called 
Education and Ecstasy(!): 
"In calling Leonard's picture of future education sentimental, I 
am not, of course, putting down his conception that education is 
concerned as much with emotional as with intellectual development, 
or that the two are and should be inextricably linked. This, I agree, 
should be the heart of any reform in schooling, for the schools of 
today are as profoundly alienating as Leonard says they are. What is 
sentimental is his depiction of the necessary improvements as 
changes in the techniques and attitudes of educators rather than in 
the society that supports them and its goals. How will students as 
appropriately lachrymose as those in Leonard's dream manage to 
take their place in the military-industrial complex? It will certainly 
not tolerate schools which render the young unfit for its service; so 
that if the schools are to educate feeling people, the system itself 
must pe changed-and not by T-groups and the Esalen Institute ... 
but by basic changes in the allocation of power and the functioning 
of the economy." 
E. Friedenberg, "Sentimental Education," The New York Review of 
Books,Nov.21, 1968. 
16. I owe this phrase to a fellow member of the Editorial Board of 
the Yale Law Journal. 
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